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  Energy-related subsidies in the federal tax system are under increasing scrutiny.  
Some note that the tax system provides large subsidies to oil and gas producers at a time 
when we should be reducing our consumption of fossil fuels.  Others note the subsidies 
provided to renewable energy and raise concerns about the marginal impact of those 
subsidies at a time when oil prices exceed $100 per barrel.   
  Less clear is the ability of firms to take advantage of these subsidies.  In 
particular, firms can only utilize energy-related tax credits if they have sufficient tax 
liability against which the credits may be offset.  In addition, the corporate Alternative 
Minimum Tax (AMT) can reduce the value of preferential depreciation rates for energy-
related capital investment and energy-related tax credits by deferring the time at which 
they may be enjoyed.   
  In this paper, we take a first look at limitations on the use of energy-related tax 
credits contained in the General Business Credit (GBC) due to limitations within the 
regular corporate income tax as well as the corporate AMT.  We find that between 2000 
and 2005, the ability of corporations to take energy-related tax credits was significantly 
curtailed by limitations in the regular tax on the use of GBCs.  We find that the corporate 
AMT has a less pronounced impact on the ability of firms to use these credits though the 
impact is not trivial.  Finally, we provide some illustrative calculations to demonstrate 
how the corporate AMT can lead to very different levelized costs of producing electricity 
from a wind power project.  Among other things, these calculations make clear the 
complexity of measuring the impact of the corporate AMT on the profitability of energy-




  The various energy related tax credits in the U.S. tax code are designed to 
encourage our use of renewable energy sources and to stimulate domestic production of 
conventional energy sources.  While the two goals might appear contradictory, they arise 
from differing energy policy objectives.  One objective is to reduce our use of energy 
sources that create negative environmental and other externalities.  Renewable electricity 
production tax credits (REPTC) have been promoted on the grounds that they provide an 
alternative to the use of fossil fuels in the production of electricity.
1  This may contribute 
to a reduction in SO2, NOx, and other emissions.
2  It also contributes to a reduction in 
CO2 emissions, of particular concern for climate change. 
  A second policy goal is to increase energy security.  While an imprecisely defined 
concept, it generally is manifested by a concern with reducing oil consumption and 
diversifying energy supplies.  Tax credits for enhanced oil recovery (EOR) contribute to a 
diversification of oil supply even if they don't contribute to a reduced reliance on oil in 
the United States.
3 
  Table 1 lists the most important energy related tax expenditures in the federal 
budget and their associated revenue loss.  Subsidies for alcohol and biodiesel fuels are the 
largest tax expenditure ($10,840 million from 2009 through 2013) with biodiesel 
                                                 
1 Over half of U.S. electricity is produced by coal-fired generating plants.  An additional sixteen percent is 
generated by natural gas-fired plants, Energy Information Administration (2007) 
2 Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act established a national cap on overall annual emissions of sulfur 
dioxide.  As long as this cap is binding, increasing the use of renewable power will not decrease sulfur 
dioxide emissions.  It will only lower the price of sulfur dioxide allowances.  A similar cap may affect SO2 
and NOx from a region comprised of 28 mostly eastern states and the District of Columbia.  The Clean Air 
Interstate Rule (CAIR), which was finalized on March 10, 2005, requires annual caps of SO2 and NOx 
emissions in this area.  On June 11, 2008, the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
found that the EPA used a flawed approach to developing CAIR and vacated the rule. 
3   A third argument often cited to support energy subsidies is the presence of market barriers.  Metcalf 
(2007) notes it is difficult to support subsidies to energy on the basis of this argument.   3
subsidies accounting for less than one percent of this figure ($80 million from 2009 
through 2013).  Most of the revenue loss associated with alcohol fuels results in a 
reduction in excise tax receipts ($10,630 million from 2009 through 2013) with the 
remainder arising from the alcohol fuel income tax credit and the tax credit for small 
ethanol producers.  The second largest single tax expenditure is the new technology credit 
($5,010 million from 2009 through 2013).  This tax expenditure includes the REPTC as 
well as an investment tax credit for solar and geothermal power. 
Table 1. Energy-Related Tax Expenditures 
(in millions of dollars) 
  2008 2009-2013 
Alternative Fuels 
Alcohol and biodiesel fuel credits  4,260 10,840 
New technology credit   800 5,010 
Credit for holding clean renewable energy bonds   40 350 
Other: energy facility bonds, clean-burning 
vehicles, fuel cell, microturbine, and solar 
investments. 360 250 
Total: Alternative Fuels 5,460 16,450 
Coal 
Alternative fuel production credit  1,310 170 
Capital gains treatment of royalties on coal   190 870 
Credit for investment in clean coal facilities   50 925 
Partial expensing for advanced mine safety 
equipment   20 - 
Total: Coal 1,570 1,965 
Energy Conservation 
Exclusion of utility conservation subsidies   120 560 
Allowance of deduction for certain energy 
efficient commercial building property   170 120 
Credit for energy efficiency improvements for 
new and existing homes   180 30 
Total: Energy Conservation 470 710 
Oil and Gas 
Excess of percentage over cost depletion, fuels   910 4,430 
Expensing of exploration and development costs, 
fuels   510 1,550   4
Other: alternative fuel production credit, partial 
expensing for new refinery investment, 
accelerated depreciation for certain natural gas 
pipelines and other investments  260 1,200 
Total: Oil and Gas 1,680 7,180 
Source:  Office of Management and Budget (2008).  Amounts are in millions of dollars.  
Note that tax expenditures should not be summed due to interactions among them.  The 
summing is done for illustrative purposes to indicate the relative importance of tax 
expenditures across different fuel sources.   
  
 
   We focus on the ability of firms to use their energy-related tax credits.  Firms are 
limited in their use of credits for two basic reasons.  First, they may not be earning 
enough positive income to take advantage of their credits.  Only 53 percent of firms in 
2005 had a positive net income.  These firms accounted for over 90 percent of total 
corporate assets.  Second, they may be limited in their use of these credits by the 
Alternative Minimum Tax.  Less than one percent of firms were affected by the corporate 
AMT, either through limits on the use of tax credits or direct AMT payments, in 2005.  
These firms, however, accounted for 23 percent of corporate assets.
4 
  The interaction between the corporate AMT and energy subsidies has not been 
explored before and so we pay particular attention to this policy.  The corporate AMT is 
designed to ensure that a taxpayer's use of certain deductions and credits does not allow 
the taxpayer to avoid significant tax liability.  In brief, the corporate AMT requires the 
filer to recompute taxable income after disallowing various preferences and adjustments.  
This gives rise to alternative minimum taxable income which – after a possible 
exemption of income, depending on the level of alternative minimum taxable income – is 
                                                 
4 Generally, the general business credit may not exceed net income tax less the greater of the taxpayer’s 
tentative minimum tax liability or 25 percent of net regular tax liability above $25,000.  However, the 
limitation is determined separately for the portion of the credit attributable to the empowerment zone and 
renewal community employment credit component, the alcohol fuels credit, and the credit for electricity 
produced from renewable sources.  For purposes of calculating the general business credit limitation, net 
regular income tax liability is the sum of regular tax less all other nonrefundable credits.   5
taxed at a twenty percent rate.  This tentative minimum tax (TMT) is compared to the 
regular tax liability and the taxpayer pays whichever is larger.  The corporate AMT may 
be credited against future regular tax liability, but the credits may not be used to reduce 
regular tax liability below the tentative minimum tax.  As a result, the corporate AMT 
largely results in the deferral, but not elimination, of certain tax benefits. 
Under the corporate AMT, firms begin with taxable income before net operating 
loss deductions and add back in a number of preferences and adjustments to compute 
alternative maximum taxable income.  These adjustments include using less generous 
depreciation schedules and tax-exempt interest income from specified private activity 
bonds, among other things.  An exemption of up to $40,000 is allowed (reduced for larger 
amounts of AMTI) and a twenty percent marginal tax rate applied.  After subtracting 
allowable foreign tax credits, the tentative minimum tax is obtained.  If this amount is 
greater than the regular tax liability, the corporation must pay the difference as an AMT.   
  Note that the tentative minimum tax is compared to the regular tax liability before 
taking all but foreign tax and possessions tax credits.  Thus a corporation may not be 
subject to the alternative minimum tax but could still be affected by it through a 
disallowance of some of its tax credits in the current year.  To illustrate with a simple 
example, a firm has a regular tax liability before tax credits of 100.  Its tentative 
minimum tax is 95.  Therefore, it need not pay an AMT tax.  But it can only use a 
maximum of 5 in tax credits to offset its regular tax liability.  A firm with 15 in current 
year tax credits would have to carry forward (or back) 10 of the current year credits to 
avoid its after-credit tax liability from following below its TMT.  This description of the   6
corporate AMT is necessarily brief.  For more information, see Lyon (1997) and Carlson 
(2005).  We turn next to explore what energy-related tax credits are used by corporations. 
 
III.  Information from the Corporate Tax Data 
 
  In this section we analyze the most important energy tax credits taken by 
corporations.  Table 2 provides information on the aggregate credits for four of the most 
significant energy tax credits received by corporations.
5 
 
Table 2.  Aggregate Value of Significant Energy Tax Credits  
Taken by Corporations 















2000 1,516,989  394,569  44,399  17,686 
2001 1,806,406  457,228  70,628  7,133 
2002 2,189,942  379,921  131,602  7,204 
2003 2,104,097  486,938  142,818  5,995 
2004 2,725,372  534,824  209,581  5,033 
2005 3,914,073  717,342  331,285  3,488 
Source: Statistics of Income Corporate Tax Return Files.  Amounts are in thousands of 
dollars. 
 
  The nonconventional source fuel credit (NSFC) was first established by the 
Windfall Profit Tax of 1980 (PL 96-223) under Section 29 of the tax code.  The section 
provides for a $3.00 per barrel of oil-equivalent production tax credit for alternative fuels 
(indexed in 1979 dollars and worth $6.79 in 2005).  The credit phases out for oil prices 
above $23.50 in 1979 dollars ($53.20 in 2005).  Originally benefitting shale and tar sand 
                                                 
5 In this paper we focus only on C-corporations, excluding S-corporations, regulated investment companies, 
real estate investment trusts and other entities that pass through their credits to individual tax filers.  Energy 
related tax credits are also received by these pass-through entities and individual tax payers.  Energy credits 
that are received by individual filers are small relative to credits earned by C-corporations.  In 2005, 
individual filers claimed credits estimated to equal $56.62 million for the EOR, $1.96 million for the 
REPTC, $2.72 million for the energy investment credit and zero for the NSFC.  These estimates are based 
on a sample of individual tax returns from the Statistics of Income.  The estimates should be viewed with 
some caution, however, due to the limited number of tax payers claiming these credits.   7
oil, synthetic fuels from coal, landfill gas and coalbed methane, the major recipient of the 
credit was coalbed methane until its eligibility for the credit ended in 2002.  Since then 
synthetic coal has been the major beneficiary of the credit.  Energy Information 
Administration (2008) notes that synthetic coal production doubled between 2002 and 
2007.
6  The Section 29 tax credit for synthetic fuels and certain biomass gas expired at 
the end of 2007. 
  The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT2005) added coke and coke gas to the list 
of qualified fuels and made the credit part of the general business credit.
7  Qualifying 
facilities must be placed in service before January, 1 2010.  The amount of credit-eligible 
coke produced may not exceed an average barrel-of-oil equivalent of 4,000 barrels per 
day. The $3.00 credit for coke or coke gas is indexed for inflation using 2004 as the base 
year instead of 1979 and does not phase out with the price of oil.  The phase-out of the 
Section 29 credit, however, does not apply to coke or coke gas.   
    The tax expenditure for this credit is estimated to be $170 million between FY 
2009 and 2013.  This is a sharp decline as the credit has essentially phased out as of 2006 
given high crude oil prices. 
  The EOR credit is a fifteen percent investment tax credit applied to various 
tertiary recovery methods for oil production and expenditures paid or incurred to 
                                                 
6 The EIA study uses the terms synthetic and refined coals interchangeably.  The American Jobs Creation 
Act of 2004 established a new tax credit for the production of refined coal as part of Section 45.  This tax 
credit did not replace the existing Section 29 credit.  To qualify for the new credit refined coal had to meet 
two standards: 1) emissions of nitrogen oxides and either sulfur dioxide or mercury in the refined coal must 
be at least twenty percent lower than would occur if feedstock coal were burned; and 2) the refined coal 
must be at least fifty percent higher in value than the feedstock.   
7 Most energy tax credits are part of the general business credit.  Prior to EPACT2005, the Section 29 
credits were an exception and so any unused credits had to be carried forward as an AMT credit.  As part of 
the general business credit, excess credits can now be carried backward one year and forward twenty years.  
EPACT2005 also redesignated Section 29 as Section 45K.   8
construct a qualifying gas treatment plant in Alaska after 2004.  To the extent that a credit 
is allowed for the cost of these methods, the taxpayer must reduce the amount otherwise 
deductible or required to be capitalized and recovered through depreciation, depletion, or 
amortization, as appropriate, with respect to the costs. The original credit was enacted in 
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 and phases out when the real price of oil 
exceeds $28 per barrel in 1991 dollars.  There was no reduction of the credit in the years 
2000 through 2005 of our analysis.
8 
  The REPTC, enacted in the Energy Policy Act of 1992, provided for a production 
tax credit of 1.5¢ per kWh (indexed) of electricity generated from wind and closed-loop 
biomass systems.
9  The credit was 2.0 ¢ per kWh in 2007.  The electricity production 
credit is reduced over a 3 cent phase out range to the extent the annual average contract 
price per kilowatt-hour of electricity sold in the prior year from the same qualified energy 
resource exceeds 8 cents (adjusted for inflation; 10.7 cents for 2007).  The credit has 
never been reduced since its enactment.  The tax credit has been extended and expanded 
over time and currently is available for wind, closed-loop biomass, open-loop biomass, 
geothermal energy, solar energy, small irrigation power, municipal solid waste, qualified 
hydropower production, refined coal and Indian coal.
10  Firms may take the credit for ten 
years.  EPACT2005 added the new hydropower and Indian coal credits with the latter 
                                                 
8 The following nine tertiary recovery methods generally qualify for the EOR credit: miscible fluid 
displacement, steam-drive injection, microemulsion flooding, in situ combustion, polymer-augmented 
water flooding, cyclic-steam injection, alkaline flooding, carbonated water flooding, and immiscible non-
hydrocarbon gas displacement, or any other method approved by the IRS. 
9 A closed-loop biomass is plant material grown specifically for use in a biomass generator. 
10 In the case of open-loop biomass facilities, small irrigation power facilities, landfill gas facilities, trash 
combustion facilities, and qualified hydropower facilities the otherwise allowable credit amount is 0.75 
cent per kilowatthour, indexed for inflation measured after 1992 (1 cent per kilowatt-hour for 2007).   9
receiving a credit of $1.50 per ton for the first four years and $2.00 per ton for three 
additional years. 
  A variety of energy investment tax credits are available.  As of 2005 – the last 
year of our analysis – a ten percent business tax credit could be taken for solar or 
geothermal property (30 percent for solar property put in place beginning in 2006 and 
running through 2008).
11  The drop off in the energy investment credit in 2005 ($3.5 
million) was likely due to the fact that the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 modified 
the REPTC to include geothermal power.  Generally, the REPTC provides a greater 
incentive for geothermal investment than the energy investment credit.  In addition 
EPACT2005 provided a 15 percent credit for advanced coal projects (20 percent for 
Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC) property) and 20 percent for qualified 
gasification projects.   
  As Table 2 indicates, the NSFC accounts for nearly 80 percent of all energy-
related tax credits received by corporations.  As noted above, this credit's share of total 
energy-related credits will likely fall in the future as the credit phases out with high oil 
prices and the credit for synthetic fuel expires at the end of 2007. 
  Focusing on the three major energy tax credits, Table 3 shows that firms with 
assets in excess of $1 billion are the predominant recipient of these credits.  The REPTC 
has a slightly more dispersed distribution with three percent of the credits being received 
by firms with assets below $50 million and four percent by firms with assets between 
$100 and $250 million.  To put these distributions in perspective, the last column of 
                                                 
11 The business energy credit also applies for the purchase of qualifying fuel cell and stationary 
microturbine power plants from 2006 through 2008.  The credit for qualifying fuel cell investment is 30 
percent but may not exceed $500 for each 0.5 kilowatt of capacity.  The credit for qualifying microturbine 
investment is limited to the lesser of 10 percent of the basis of the property or $200 for each kilowatt of 
capacity.     10
Table 3 reports the distribution of general business credits for all firms reporting positive 
GBCs in 2005.  Firms with assets in excess of $1 billion received 71 percent of all GBCs.  
In general, it appears that energy-related GBCs are more highly concentrated in very 
large firms. 
 
Table 3.  2005 Energy Tax Credits by Firm Size 
















Under 1,000  35,159 2,153 2,374 
 
1,608,222 
Between 1,000 and 10,000  17,314 43 1,891 
 
1,574,013 
Between 10,000 and 50,000  8,222 1,019 2,729 
 
2,111,301 
Between 50,000 and 100,000  863 12 142 
 
1,215,963 
Between 100,000 and 250,000  1,125 672 11,978 
 
1,730,079 
Between 250,000 and 500,000  5,022 16 1,267 
 
1,700,059 
Between 500,000 and 
1,000,000 673 14,974 7,778 
 
1,892,589 
Greater than 1,000,000  3,845,696 698,454 303,125 
 
29,266,699 
Total 3,914,073 717,342 331,285  41,098,924
Source: Statistics of Income Corporate Tax Return Files.  The last column reports the distribution of GBCs for all firms 
with positive GBCs.  Figures include the portion of the GBC credit attributable to the empowerment zone and renewal 
community employment credit component, the alcohol fuels credit, and the credit for electricity produced from renewable 
sources that do not appear on IRS Form 3800. 
 
 
  Table 4 shows the distribution of energy tax credits by industry sector.  Almost 80 
percent of the NSFCs were taken by firms in the finance and insurance (31 percent), the 
utility industry (30 percent) and the manufacturing industry (17 percent).  The 
manufacturing sector includes large integrated oil companies. The EOR is highly 
concentrated with 69 percent of the credits taken by manufacturers and 21 percent by   11
firms in the mining industry.  The REPTC is also highly concentrated with 70 percent 
taken by the utilities industry and 11 percent taken by the manufacturing industry.  The 
credits also tend to be fairly concentrated in a small number of firms.  In 2005, five firms 
out of 282, based on firm observation weights, accounted for over 60 percent of the 
REPTC.
12  In the same year, five firms out of 33, based on firm observation weights, 
accounted for 35 percent of the NSFC and for the EOR credit 5 firms out of 246 
accounted for 69 percent of the credits. 
Table 4.  2005 Energy Tax Credits by Industry Sector 

























Mining 4,843  152,780  2,099   
 
328,627 
Utilities 1,156,307  11,503  233,963   
 
1,244,757 
Construction 80,690  28  4,172   
 
73,991 
Manufacturing 649,233  492,998  34,888   
 
21,473,499 
Wholesale Trade  10,027  28,635  4,921  
 
988,268 




Warehousing 112,023  -   6,228   
 
231,473 
Information 5,772  -   -   
 
3,606,824 
Finance and Insurance  1,205,938  203  9,663  
 
3,243,994 
Real Estate, Rental and 
Leasing 2,106  16  712   
 
124,357 
                                                 
12 The data used in this analysis are constructed annually by the Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of 
Income (SOI) based on a sample of all corporate tax returns filed.  The files are stratified to sample larger 
firms at a greater rate than smaller firms.  Therefore, an observation from a smaller firm will represent tax 
returns from a larger number of similarly sized firms.   12
Professional, Scientific, 
and Technical Services  0  4  3,094  
 
4,175,924 















Education Services  - - - 
 
4,313 
Health Care and Social 
Insurance - - - 
 
350,193 
Arts, Entertainment and 




Recreation 120,515  -   124   
 
1,230,599 
Other Services  - - - 
Total 3,914,073  717,342  331,285    41,098,924
Source: Statistics of Income Corporate Tax Return Files.  Amounts are in thousands of dollars.  The 
last column reports the distribution of GBCs for all firms with positive GBCs. 
 
 
  We also considered what other general business credits are taken by firms that 
take the major energy tax credits.  Table 5 reports this information.  Interestingly, firms 
taking energy related tax credits take substantial amounts of low income housing 
credits.
13  For firms taking the REPTC, for example, the low income housing credit 
comprises 46 percent of their general business credits in 2005.  In contrast, for all firms 
reporting some general business credits, the low income housing credit accounts for 25 
percent of total credits.   
 
                                                 
13 Desai, et al. (2008) provide a description and analysis of this tax credit.  Many but not all of these credits 
are taken by firms in the finance and insurance industry.  Excluding these firms, the share of low income 
housing credits taken by firms claiming the NSFC falls to 15 percent and the share taken by firms claiming 
the REPTC falls to 35 percent.  In contrast the share rises for firms taking the EOR to 38 percent.     13
Table 5.  Other Credits Taken by Energy Credit Taking Firms in 2005 
 NSFC  EOR  REPTC  All Firms 
with GBCs 
NSFC  61% 15% 35% 21% 
EOR  3% 31% 2% 4% 
REPTC  1% 2% 9% 2% 
Low Income 
Housing Credit  25% 35% 46% 25% 




3% 6% 4%  34% 
This table reports the share of current year GBCs and nonconventional fuel credits taken in the 
row categories conditional on the corporation taking the credit in the column header.  See text for 
more information.   
Source: Statistics of Income Corporate Tax Return Files.  Amounts are in thousands of dollars. 
 
  Summing up, we observe that most of the energy credits are taken by very large 
firms and generally in sectors that one would expect.  However, energy credits are taken 
by firms in a fairly large number of industries.  Firms taking the top energy credits are 
also taking large amounts of low income housing credits.   
V.  Impact of the AMT on GBCs 
 
  Firms cannot always use their energy tax credits (or other general business 
credits).   One benefit of the GBC (and complication for tax analysts) is that unused 
general business credits may be carried back one year and forward twenty years.
14   This 
provides flexibility and additional value for credits than occurs in the absence of the GBC 
rules.  The Nonconventional Source Fuel Credit was made part of the general business 
credit in EPACT2005 precisely to allow firms to take advantage of the carry forward and 
backward rules.  Prior to this change in the tax code, NSFCs not taken in the current year 
became AMT credits. 
                                                 
14 Some credits unused at the end of the twenty year period or upon the death of an individual taxpayer may 
be taken as a deduction in the subsequent tax year.  Of the three credits we focus on in this paper, only the 
EOR is eligible for this deduction.   14
  Firms cannot use tax credits in the current year either because they don't have 
sufficient regular tax liability against which to offset the credit or the credit would reduce 
their tax liability below the tentative minimum tax.  Most tax credits may be used to the 
extent that the filer's tax liability does not fall below its TMT.  As noted above a firm 
may not have to pay any AMT tax but could still have its tax liability increased by the 
presence of the AMT.   
  We use a Treasury tax calculator that performs the same calculations a tax filer 
would make when filling out the general business credit Form 3800 and any additional 
required business credit forms.  In 2005, our tax calculator determined that firms could 
use $13.1 billion in general business credits out of an available stock of $41.1 billion.  
The corporate tax file reports that $13.5 billion general business credits were used in 
2005.  The $400 million difference is due to observations with missing data and other 
potential data quality issues.  Certain general business credits are not included on Form 
3800 and are calculated after the credits appearing on the Form 3800.  A taxpayer’s 
tentative minimum tax is treated as being zero for purposes of determining the tax 
liability limitation with respect to the section 45 credit for electricity produced from a 
facility (placed in service after October 22, 2004) during the first four years of production 
beginning on the date the facility is placed in service.  These renewable production tax 
credits are part of the general business credit and are calculated on Form 8835.  In 
addition, the empowerment zone and renewal community employment credit (Form 
8844), the alcohol fuels credit (Form 6478) and the New York Liberty Zone employee 
credit (Form 8884) are also components of the general business credit but not subject to 
the general business credit limitation rules.   15
To determine the effect of the AMT on the three energy credits examined in this 
study, a taxpayer’s tentative minimum tax is treated as being zero for the purpose of 
determining a firm’s tax liability limitation with respect to each individual energy credit.  
In addition, the allowable energy credits are computed after all other general business tax 
credits have been determined. 
Our analysis uses data from income tax returns from the Internal Revenue 
Service, Statistics of Income (SOI) Corporate Tax Return files for 2000 through 2005.  
The SOI files are constructed annually based on a sample of all corporate tax returns 
filed.  The SOI files are stratified to sample larger firms at a greater rate than smaller 
firms.  Most corporations with assets in excess of $50 million are included in the sample.  
We have excluded S-corporations, regulated investment companies and real estate 
investment trusts from our analysis. 
  In 2005 less than one percent of corporations were subject to the AMT or affected 
by the TMT.  But almost one-quarter of corporate assets were in firms affected by the 
AMT in that year.  Alternatively, of the 2,902 firms with assets in excess of $1 billion in 
2005, 22 percent of these firms either made positive AMT payments or were affected by 
the TMT limitation.  Firms in the manufacturing, mining, and utilities industries, 
industries most likely to take energy related tax credits were disproportionately affected 
by the AMT.  Forty-two percent of the utility industry’s corporate assets were in firms 
affected by the AMT.  The figures for the mining industry and the manufacturing 
industry were 40 percent and 33 percent respectively. 
  Table 6 shows how the general business credit of firms in 2005 taking certain 
energy tax credits is affected by the AMT.  For firms that report a nonconventional   16
source fuel credit, their total usable GBCs on their form 1120 totaled $355 million in 
2005.
15  The next row shows the total GBCs before any limitation on their use.  This 
includes carry forwards from previous years.  The third row reports a calculation of 
aggregate GBCs that could be used in the absence of an AMT TMT limitation.  
Comparing the first and second rows, we see that firms reporting an NSFC on their form 
3800 were able to use 21 percent of their GBCs (and carry forwards) in 2005.  The 
difference between the third row and the first row reveals the number of GBC’s that 
could not be used due to TMT limitations ($806 million).  This represents 47 percent of 
total GBCs (row three) from firms reporting a nonconventional fuel credit that could not 
be used due to TMT limitations.  The remaining 33 percent of total tentative GBCs were 
unavailable for current use due to regular tax limitations. 
  Comparing the three energy related tax credits in Table 6, firms reporting an 
NSFC were most affected by the AMT.  For the NSFC and the REPTC, between one-
quarter and one-half of these credits are unavailable for use due to TMT limitations.  This 
is considerably higher than the average for all firms reporting positive GBCs.  Firms 
receiving EOR credits were not affected by TMT limitations.  Generally, these firms 
reported relatively large regular tax liabilities in 2005, which make TMT limitations less 
binding if AMT adjustments and preferences have not changed. 
 
 
                                                 
15 This is just the portion of the NSFC included in their GBC for firms with 2005 tax years ending after 
December 31, 2005 when the NSFC became part of the general business credit.   17
Table 6.  Use of GBCs in 2005 
(credit amounts in thousands of dollars) 
  
NSFC EOR  REPTC  All  Firms 
Total Usable GBCs  355,097 1,701,953 1,490,999 13,080,968  
Total Tentative GBCs  1,728,160 2,160,284 2,910,347 41,098,924  
Total GBCs: no TMT 
Limitation  1,160,725 1,760,070 2,177,489 15,407,375  
Share of GBCs Used in 
Current Year  21% 79% 51%  32% 
Share of GBCs Unusable 
in Current Year due to 
TMT Limitation 
47% 3% 24%  6% 
Share of GBCs Unusable 
in Current Year due to 
Regular Tax Limitations 
33% 19% 25%  63% 
Total tentative GBCs include carry forwards.  The All Firms column 
includes all firms with GBC greater than zero.  See text for explanation. 
Source: Statistics of Income Corporate Tax Return Files.  
 
  The calculations in Table 6 include carry forwards.  Another way to look at the 
data is to consider what share of newly minted energy-related tax credits are available for 
use in the current year.  Table 7 reports the results.  We calculated the level of usable 
GBCs if no energy related tax credit were reported on form 3800 in 2005.  Consider the 
first column.  Firms reported an aggregate of $496 million in NSFC in 2005.  Had they 
reported no NSFCs on form 3800, their usable GBCs would have fallen from $355 
million to $284 million, a difference of $71 million.  In other words, $71 million out of 
$496 million in year 2005 NSFCs were used in 2005.  This represents 14 percent of their 
usable GBCs in that year.   In a second calculation, we remove the TMT restriction on the 
use of NSFCs on form 3800.  This increases the amount of usable GBCs by $275 million,   18
55 percent of total NSFCs reported on form 3800.  The remainder of the $496 million – 
30 percent – were limited due to regular tax constraints.  This is calculated as a residual. 
  Table 7 indicates that the NSFCs contained in the GBC were most affected by the 
AMT in 2005.  Over half of the new credits could not be taken in 2005.  Most of the EOR 
credits could be taken in the current year while roughly half of the REPTCs were taken in 
2005.  For these two latter tax credits, regular tax limitations were more significant than 
the AMT in reducing the immediate use of the tax credits. REPTCs earned from facilities 
producing renewable power placed in service after October 22, 2004 were not included in 
this analysis as they were not subject to TMT limitations. 
 
 
Table 7.  Disposition of New Credits in 2005 
(credit amounts in thousands of dollars) 
 NSFC  EOR  REPTC 
Aggregate Energy Credit  495,668  717,342 223,879 
Contained in current year GBC  14%  88%  53% 
Deferred due to TMT 
Limitation  55% 4% 13% 
Deferred due to regular tax 
limitation  30% 9% 34% 
Excludes post October 22, 2004 REPTCs.    See text for details. 
Source: Statistics of Income Corporate Tax Return Files. 
 
 
  We carried out a similar calculation for the REPTC for the years 2000 through 
2005.  Table 8 reports the results.  For most years, between half and two-thirds of credit 
could be taken in the current year.  In 2003 and 2004, however, only one-quarter of the 
credits could be taken immediately.  The time series suggests that the AMT in general has 
not had a significant impact on the ability of firms to take the REPTC with the aggregate 
amount deferred due to TMT limitations equal to 5 percent or less in four out of six of the 
years.     19
 
Table 8.  Disposition of New REPTCs 
(credit amounts in thousands of dollars) 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Aggregate REPTC Credits  44,399  70,629  131,602 142,818  207,251  223,879
Contained in current year GBC  59% 60% 65% 27% 27% 53% 
Deferred due to TMT 
Limitation  0% 1% 9% 5% 0%  13% 
Deferred due to regular tax 
limitation  41% 39% 26% 68% 73% 34% 
Excludes post October 22, 2004 REPTCs.  See text for details. 
Source: Statistics of Income Corporate Tax Return Files. 
 
 
  The fact that a firm may not be able to use an energy-related tax credit in the 
current year suggests the question of when they will be able to use it.  Table 9 reports 
data on the average number of years GBCs are limited for firms that report a REPTC.  All 
firms observed in at least five years are limited in their use of their GBC in at least one 
year.   For firms that are observed three or more years in the data, there is a 90 percent 
probability that the firm will be limited in its use of its GBC in at least one year. 
  From the underlying data, we can compute the probability of limited GBCs for 
firms reporting an REPTC conditional on the years observed in the Treasury data.  In any 
given year there is a 60 percent probability that a firm reporting an REPTC will have its 
GBCs limited for some reason.  Conditional on the firm having its GBC limited in a 
given year, the probability that it will be limited in the following year rises to 85 percent.  
And for those firms who are have been limited in two consecutive years, the probability 
that their GBC will be limited in a third year is 78 percent. 
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1 0.53  68 
2 1.07  27 
3 1.92  13 
4 2.38  8 
5 3.29  7 
6 4.29  7 
This table reports the number of years that firms reporting 
REPTCs are limited in their use of GBCs for any reason. 
 
 
  General business credits can be limited because the firm is in a loss situation or 
simply has insufficient regular tax against which to apply the GBC.  It may also be 
limited because of the AMT.   Table 10 is similar to the previous table except that it 
focuses on GBC limitations due to the TMT.  Now we observe that roughly half the firms 
observed for three or more years have TMT limitations on their GBC in at least one year.  
For firms in the sample for six years, the probability of a TMT limitation in more than 
one year equals 43 percent.  While the AMT alone cannot explain limitations on the use 
of GBCs, its impact is far from trivial. 
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By TMT  Total 
1 0.04 68 
2 0.15 27 
3 0.31 13 
4 0.38  8 
5 0.86  7 
6 1.43  7 
This table reports the number of years that firms reporting 
REPTCs are limited in their use of GBCs because of the 
TMT. 
  
  This section has shown that the AMT can affect a firm's ability to use energy-
related tax credits in a given year.  While less of a limitation on the immediate use of 
credits than the restriction under the regular income that credits may not exceed before-
credit tax liability, the AMT does affect the value of these credits.  The loss in value 
arises from the deferral of tax benefits into the future.  When the benefits may be realized 
depends in part on when the firm leaves AMT status.  As a result measuring the impact of 
the AMT on firms’ investment decisions is highly complex.  We turn in the next section 
to providing some examples to illustrate just how complex the impact of the AMT on 
investment is. 
 
III.  The Alternative Minimum Tax and Project Choice: An Example 
 
  This section illustrates the complexity of the AMT by focusing on a particular 
investment decision: the choice of an electricity generation investment using a levelized 
cost analysis.  The levelized cost analysis asks what price must be received for electricity 
sold by a generator to cover fixed and variable costs of providing the electricity including   22
the required return for equity owners.
16  This approach has been used in a variety of 
studies of electric power generation (e.g.  Deutch and Moniz (2003), Tolley and Jones 
(2004), and Sekar, et al. (2005)).  We follow the methodology of Metcalf (2007).  The 
steps to constructing an estimate of levelized cost are: 
 
•  Compute the present discounted value of costs in each year over life of a project.  
This includes all capital and operating costs net of tax deductions. 
•  Sum all costs over life of project.  This is the present discounted value of the 
project’s overall costs. 
•  Compute the amount of constant real before-tax revenue required each year that 
will equal the total present discounted value of costs over the life of the project. 
•  Divide this required revenue value by total kilowatt-hours produced by plant to 
obtain a cost per kWh. 
  In particular we consider the construction of a wind project using the cost and 
technology assumptions used in Metcalf (2007).  The firm undertaking the project has 
other projects that generate income and costs and for simplicity we take assume that the 
tax status of the firm (regular, AMT, or TMT) is determined by factors unrelated to this 
particular project.  The AMT has the following implications for the wind project cost 
calculation: 
 
•  Income streams from the project will be taxed at the AMT 20 percent tax rate 
rather than the regular corporate income tax rate of 35 percent.
17 
•  The production tax credit cannot be taken immediately.   
•  The project must be depreciated over five years using the 150 percent declining 
balance method rather than the 200 percent declining balance method.   
•  An AMT tax credit may be carried forward and applied against regular tax 
liability if the firm leaves AMT status.  Its use of this credit is limited by its 
tentative minimum tax.  We make various assumptions about the ability to use the 
AMT credit in calculations below. 
                                                 
16 The price is a constant real price received over the life of the plant to cover lifetime fixed and variable 
costs.   
17 We ignore the impact of the section 199 domestic production deduction as well as state taxes.   23
 
  We compute levelized costs for the wind project using parameter assumptions 
taken from Metcalf (2007).  Table 11 presents levelized cost calculations for a wind 
project that is put into place in 2005.  Under the tax rules in place for that year and 
assuming the firm is not on the AMT, the levelized cost is 5.00¢ per kWh.  A firm that is 
on the AMT cannot use the production tax credit and must depreciate the capital using a 
less generous schedule.  Its income on the project, however, is taxed at a lower marginal 
tax rate.  The result is to raise the levelized cost of the project by just under two percent.   
Table 11.  Wind Power Levelized Costs 
1 No  AMT  5.00
2 AMT  Always  5.09
AMT for Five Years 
3  Credit usable in year 6 5.14
4  Credit usable in year 15 5.24
5  Credit never usable 5.50
6  AMT Starts in Three Years 4.72
AMT Starts in 3 years and Lasts for 5 years 
7  Credit usable in year 9 5.00
8  Credit usable in year 18 5.03
9  Credit never usable 5.05
10  No PTC and Five Year 
Depreciation 5.19
11  PTC and Fifteen Year 
DDB Depreciation 5.53
12  No PTC and Fifteen Year 
DDB Depreciation  5.73
Source: Authors' calculations. 
 
  This example illustrates that the AMT may not substantially affect the cost of a 
project.  But the result is sensitive to the firm's status on the AMT.  We next assume that 
the firm is on the AMT when the project begins and stays on the AMT for five years.  It 
then returns to regular tax status and never returns to AMT status.  We assume that any 
change in tax liability from being on the AMT attributable to this project can add to a   24
firm's AMT tax credit if the net tax liability increases or can be used to reduce existing 
liability if the net tax implications for the project in a given year are negative.  This is 
equivalent to reducing the cumulative AMT credit from other parts of the firm's 
activities. 
  If the firm may use the AMT credit attributable to this project the first year it 
returns to regular tax status, the levelized cost is 5.14¢ per kWh.  Note that it is more 
costly to be on the AMT for a short period of time rather than permanently.  This reflects 
that fact that the gain of the production tax credit in the sixth through tenth year of the 
project is more than offset by the higher taxes paid on income from the project from year 
six on.  This mirrors finding by Lyon (1990) that temporary status on the AMT can raise 
the cost of capital for firms more than being on the AMT permanently.  The longer the 
firm must wait in order to use its AMT credit the higher the levelized cost rises.  In the 
limit when the credit can never be used, the levelized cost rises to 5.50¢ per kWh.   
  The AMT need not raise the costs of projects.  The next row of Table 11 assumes 
the firm starts on the regular tax and becomes liable to the AMT in three years.  If it stays 
on the AMT permanently, the levelized cost is reduced to 4.72¢ per kWh.  Now the firm 
gets to take generous depreciation and production tax credits early in the project's life.  
By the time the firm enters AMT status, it has used much of its depreciation for the 
project.  While it forgoes several years of production tax credits, its income is taxed at the 
lower marginal tax rate for the remainder of the project.  The next three rows show the 
impact of a delayed entry into temporary AMT status.  The AMT in this case has little 
impact on the cost of the project.     25
  Finally we consider the case where the firm is not on the AMT but its tentative 
minimum tax is such that it cannot utilize the production tax credit.  This could occur if 
the firm's regular tax liability before credits (except foreign tax credits) exceeds its 
tentative minimum tax but use of the credits will push the firm into AMT status.  If the 
credits are never available for use, it is as if the production tax credit has been removed 
for a firm on the regular tax in which case the levelized cost rises to 5.19¢ per kWh.   
  While the focus in energy policy has been on the production tax credit, the five 
year depreciation of the project has considerable value.  As the entry in line 11 indicates, 
the levelized cost for a firm on the regular tax that can use the production tax credit but 
must depreciate the asset over fifteen years rises to 5.53¢ per kWh.  Lengthening 
depreciation and eliminating the PTC increases the levelized cost further to 5.73¢.  The 
shortened tax life available for assets eligible for the section 45 and 48 tax credits appears 
to be as valuable if not more valuable than the production tax credit itself. 
  These calculations are all ex post cost calculations.  When the firm is deciding to 
make a renewable energy investment it may not know whether and how long it will be 
subject to the AMT.  Nor will it necessarily know whether or when it can use the AMT 
tax credit attributable to this project.  Thus the AMT can add considerable uncertainty to 
the tax consequences of the firm's investment in this project.  It is unclear how this affects 
the willingness of firms to invest in capital projects.
18 
  The AMT may ultimately interact with other renewable energy policy in 
unexpected ways.    According to the Department of Energy, 29 states plus the District of 
Columbia have or will have renewable portfolio standards that will require or set 
                                                 
18 This analysis has focused on the impact of the AMT on the levelized cost of projects.  Regular tax 
limitations on the use of GBCs can also affect a project's levelized cost.  We leave that analysis for future 
research.   26
voluntary goals that a certain percentage of the states electricity use to come from 
renewable power.  If these standards are binding, federal tax incentives will simply affect 
the price of renewable electricity rather than the amount generated as firms compete to 
supply a fixed demand for renewable power.
19   
VI. Conclusion 
 
  This paper is a first effort to look at how energy-related tax credits in the 
corporate income tax are impacted by limitations on the use of the general business credit 
with particular attention paid to the impact of the corporate Alternative Minimum Tax.  
For a sample of corporate tax returns between 2000 and 2005, we find that the AMT has 
a limited impact on the ability of firms to immediately use an energy-related tax credit.  
The impact varies across energy-related tax credits with the Nonconventional Source 
Fuel Credit most impacted by the corporate AMT in 2005.   
  We also provide an illustrative example of the corporate AMT's impact on a firm's 
cost of investing in a wind powered electricity generating project.  The corporate AMT's 
impact on cost is highly variable depending importantly on when the firm enters AMT 
status, how long it stays on the AMT and other income streams within the firm.   
  The results of the empirical analysis and the levelized cost calculations suggest 
the value of looking more closely at how the corporate AMT affects the value of energy-
related subsidies in the federal tax system.  Considerable discussion has ensued over 
reforming the AMT.
20  An interesting question is how any AMT reforms would affect the 
                                                 
19 For a list of sate’s renewable portfolio standards see the Department of Energy, 
http://www.eere.energy.gov/states/maps/renewable_portfolio_states.cfm 
20 Most popular discussions focus on the individual AMT.  But many tax practitioners and economists have 
argued on equity and efficiency grounds that the corporate AMT should also be abolished.   27
value of energy subsidies in the tax system.  This research is a first effort at addressing 
this important question.   28
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